Predestinarian Orthodoxy, or Why Arminianism is Origenist

In a sermon, Greg Boyd, an Anabaptist-Evangelical pastor who is (in)famous as an Open Theist, made an analogized God's providence as perfect foresight. Imagine, he said, that God is the grandmaster of all grandmaster chess players; He can foresee all moves and is never out-foxed or outwitted. Boyd's point is that there's no incongruity between human freedom and God's providence. It's not exactly a bad analogy (though one might ask how free you are if your opponent can meet your every move). But the purpose of the analogy is fundamentally mistaken. It's trying to justify why some reject God's grace and suffer judgement (last time I checked, Boyd was an annihilationist, though I don't know if that's changed). But the original problem remains: if God is so infinitely wise as grandmaster of cosmic chess, then how come still end up damned if God's salvation is for all? Did God run out of chess moves to persuade the human being towards the good? Are some people incorrigibly damned, a reality born not from contingency but from some internal necessity? If Boyd's example is successful, then it means his theology posits that divine omnipotence doesn't extend over human souls.

It's precisely here where most people get confused about questions of predestination and free will. The fundamental question is not about how predestination operates with human freedom; it's whether divine predestination actually exists or not.

Despite Protestant hagiographies of the Reformation, the Reformers didn't "recover" predestination from oblivion. Augustine didn't get lost. Predestination was already a pretty strong doctrine within the Roman fold (especially among the Dominicans). This is overlooked when one took polemical accusations of Pelagianism too seriously and with a broad brush. This accusation certainly applied to Erasmian Humanism, which nearly denied divine power outside of the human will. It was also present in the late Medieval via moderna. A piety that was intended to be accessible to (wealthy) lay people, the via moderna posited that God gave grace in response to the sinner doing the best with what he had (in the words of Gabriel Biel, an advocate for the via moderna, it was "doing what was in you"). The Reformers were certainly right to accuse Erasmus of Pelagianism, and the via moderna of semi-Pelagianism. But such did not correspond to the entirety of medieval Latin theology.

Somethings the Reformers said made loyal Romans blanche. Luther, seeing the human conscience as utterly depraved and lost, languishing in the filth of stinking sin, renounced all human effort in the work of salvation. Ridden either by God or the devil, man was passive before spiritual forces which brought about salvation. Luther focused on Christ as the face of God towards man, lamenting the naked Deus absconditus, the hidden God who had decreed man's fate from before the creation. Not a few Roman Catholics repudiated Luther's utterly abysmal account of human ability. But this has nothing to do with predestination. Luther was certainly a predestinarian, but Thomists repudiated Luther for his low anthropology. Not all Roman Catholics eagerly embraced either Erasmian humanism or the via moderna inward turn. Not all Roman Catholics embraced such a high view of man's ability (per Renaissance humanists) nor did they necessarily follow the nominalist metaphysics of the via moderna. But again, none of this has to do with predestination strictly defined.

The problem debated was soteriology, how one was saved. While the Reformers (whether Lutheran or Reformed) attacked pelagianism through an emphasis on God's sovereign saving will, they were not alone in defending predestination. The Thomist Dominicans were strictly predestinarian, and would find themselves locked in debate with the new Tridentine order of Jesuits. It was this affinity over predestination that allowed Reformed theologians to eagerly adapt Thomism in their bid to dogmatically defend the Reformation. Debates between many groups depended not on whether predestination existed, but the specific schema about it. Tridentine Thomists would reject sola fide, but still advance predestination, the idea that God alone is principally responsible for salvation. Thomists, through Aristotelian categories, defended God's sovereign action within an account where man participated in this salvation through his works. And yet those works were themselves given and part of God's predestination. Salvation meant the internalization of created grace through man's efforts, where holiness was made a second nature through one's habitus (like habit, but stronger).

While Reformers would accuse this scheme of being semi-Pelagian, that doesn't mean that's how it was. Lutherans and Calvinists thought Tridentine Thomism mixed up justification with sanctification, not placing man's salvation on a proper footing. They emphasized that the distinction was to preserve the cause of a man's good works from the good works themselves. To confuse them was to stumble towards self-righteousness. But most Reformers did not deny that good works were necessary for salvation, or that saving faith would automatically produce them. Additionally, Thomas and Thomists believed God alone determined who would be saved. In a metaphysical sense, God as the first cause and source of all primary causes brought about the world in which mean strove for righteousness. Conceptual schemas about how predestination came about differed, but both orthodox Thomist Roman Catholics and many Reformers agreed on the sheer fact of God's sovereign predestination.

However, over the course of confessional infighting, a shift took place within both groups. Roman Catholics saw the development of Molinism, which became equated as Jesuit orthodoxy. The Dominicans, as well as committed Augustinians (who became known as Jansenists, resisted the Jesuits' Molinism (among other unique doctrinal additions. Within the Reformed world, Jacob Arminius (a student of Theodore Beza) advanced a similar schema. Arminius' supporters, the Remonstrants, would lock horns with the majority of the Reformed world. Both the Molinists and Arminians offered a radical restructuring of predestination from the inside out. I argue these modifications result in a turn towards Origenistic speculation.

Neither Molinists or Arminians denied human sinfulness or man's incapacity to act righteously. Additionally, neither group denied God's need to graciously intervene on man's behalf to save the race. However, they both shifted God's direct foreknowledge towards a speculative foreknowledge. Thus, God's foreknowing did not have causal implications. He could look into the future and select the best possible option among several (the basic definition of "middle knowledge"). But since this speculative foreknowledge was tethered to salvation, what did God foresee? Since both Molinists and Arminians believed God had to give grace, God's foreknowledge about who to save hits a snag. What exactly is God looking for, if He is looking ahead in order to give the grace? Neither Jesuits nor Remonstrants were universalists, so that meant God's grace was only effective for some. For both, God's foreknowledge saw whether x had faith or not and would response with grace. But how does man exercise faith if faith itself is a gift from God (Ephesians 2:8)? Nevertheless, God would grant grace to those He foresaw having faith. Thus, God granted the necessary prevenient grace that would enable humans to believe who then were granted saving faith in response.

The point here is not the concept of prevenient grace, which is irrelevant to the major point. Augustine, who was a clear predestinarian, first used the concept to describe how God acts in various ways towards the unbeliever before they actually receive baptismal regeneration (Augustine saw his own life, before his conversion, in providential terms). It doesn't matter how many categories of grace there are, both before, during, and after conversion: it's still doesn't touch the issue of predestination. What's unique about Arminians and Molinists is the Origenistic element of speculative foreknowledge.

Based upon the varied secondary literature I've read, Origen wanted to justify God's providence in human history. The issue isn't universal salvation, since Origen likely believed in something like it. Rather, Origen saw so much evil and suffering in the world among those who didn't deserve it; he saw men who hardened their hearts and doubled down in their sin, while others rejoiced and converted to the truth. How to make sense of these facts if God is omnipotent? Origen believed in something like a pre-existent world of souls, who freely acted as good or evil. God judged souls in soul-world, which determined their allotment in the world of matter. Since Origen believed Jesus had a human soul, this particular soul was exceptionally righteous and earned the right to be united to the Logos. Otherwise, why would God inhabit this human at this time, and not another? God was not arbitrary and so there needed to be a reason. Now, it's not clear to me whether Origen actually believed the above as a metaphysical fact, or whether he speculated it as a way to understand the current state of affairs. It is quite possible it was the former, which became the latter among some of his later disciple. And it was this latter view, reified as a metaphysical doctrine, which was condemned as Origenism. In either case, it parallels quite nicely with Arminianism and Molinism. It involves speculative knowledge of totally free acts (some sort of gaze down the wormhole whether x would believe freely or not), which informed God's concrete action in the actually existing world.

The conceptual fuzziness between worlds (actual and speculative) allows this schema to grow up within otherwise predestinarian doctrines. But what is this other speculative world? Is it a world where Adam didn't fall? Is it a world where God didn't act? Is it a possible world where God simply knows every effect of every action He makes, and subsequently chooses the best option which is maximally beneficial? The division between the real and speculative allows the determination to save or damn to depend upon circumstances beyond God's power. The schema is grafted onto preexisting ones, and subtly alters the terms of debate, where predestination loses all conceptual meaning.
 

A potential case of this subtle shift is the Orthodox Synod of Jerusalem (1672). Cyril Lukaris (patriarch of Constantinople) became friendly with the Reformed, writing letters to England and Geneva. In favor of some of the doctrinal formulas out west, Cyril (or one of his disciples) penned a confession for the Greek Orthodox church. In response, Dositheos (patriarch of Jerusalem) calls a council together to condemn this confession and offer an alternative. In the text of the synod (the Confession of Dositheos), it states"He foreknew the one would make a right use of their free-will, and the other a wrong, He predestinated the one, or condemned the other." Subsequently, the confession condemns any doctrine that makes God the author of sin or advances double predestination. But this formula sounds awfully Molinistic. I have a suspicion that the council's confession reflects Jesuit influence. Due to  the Franco-Turkish peace, French clergy found themselves in Constantinople. Like Orthodox among the Slavic nations, the Greeks had not kept pace with educational needs (which was, perhaps, why Cyril was first enamored with his friends among the Reformed). The Jesuits plugged this hole, which not only advanced their manual theology (which impacted Orthodox in many countries until the 19th/20th c.) but also seek converts. The two didn't coincide. Peter Mogila (1596-1647), patriarch of all Rus, adopts Jesuit manual theology and used it to defend Orthodox against Uniatism (Orthodox who submitted to Rome, but kept their distinct Greek liturgy and customs). Similarly, Dositheos does not seem to be anywhere close to Uniatism. Yet the influence of Jesuit Molinism seems quite clear in how Dositheos argues.

The facts of real foreknowledge vs. speculative real knowledge determine whether predestination means anything as a concept. Origenist metaphysics, with claims about a real preexisting world, obscure the conceptual similarity of speculative foreknowledge. Rather the crude Origenism that is condemned is more like someone confusing a metaphor for a plain statement of fact. It's a redherring, along with all the additional elements of prevenient grace, synergy, etc. It's non-sequitor for the question of predestination. There may be various ways to adhere to predestination (Tridentine Thomist, Lutheran, Reformed Orthodox, hyper-Calvinist, etc.), but they all share the same commitment to a concept. In contrast, Origen (and the crude Origenist metaphysicians) shares a fundamental rejection of predestination along with Arminians and Molinists, all other differences aside. To frame the issue starkly: you either believe in predestination or you don't. And if you don't you admit that God is utterly powerless to effect human destiny. In a way, all three streams are reminiscent of Valentinian gnosticism, where the human spirit is a divine spark that simply emanates from the One. No level of contingency within this world of change and flux can prevent its inevitable return back to the world of spirits. Without formal universalism, any damnation means that fundamentally God could do nothing to bring all souls back to Him.

Fundamentally, all anti-predestinarians reject God's sovereignty over history. The idea that God would call Abraham for no justifiable reason is strange. That's why many Second Temple Jews invented stories that Abraham was chosen because he smashed up his father's idol factory. Some reason must be given why this man was chosen. Whether one creates an origin story, or speculates God saw some trait or element (almost like a utilitarian) that made Abraham special and fitted for this role, the result is the same: God needs to give an account. In contrast, for st. Paul, Abraham (from his call to Isaac's birth) highlights how God can do what He wants out of whatever. God does not depend upon historical events, but drives them forward. God is the Absolute subject, not subject to necessity. And if this is so, then human history unfolds (whatever one's soteriological scheme) as He guides it. His foreknowledge is causally direct.

Much of the debate about predestination is fundamentally confused. They mistake related concepts for the question at hand. Sure, it may be important to debate soteriology, about the role of good works in salvation and the interrelation between justification and sanctification. Sure, categories of grace may illuminate how one thinks about conversion, what leads up to it, how it happens, and what comes next. And sure, it may be helpful to understand how the sacraments relate to the maturation of the saints. But none of these things directly deal with predestination and its converse.

Here are your options:

1) be a predestinarian, and thus be a right-believing catholic and biblical Christian

2) embrace speculative foreknowledge, and thus an esoteric Origenism. You can either become a universalist or believe God is powerless to save all. But in either case, be clear that you reject predestination.

3) Be a Pelagian, and reject any notion that God intervenes in man's salvation, except from the outside.

4) Become an atheist in the traditional sense, denying any divine providence (whether or not you reject the existence of God). This encompasses both literal atheists, but also Epicureans (who believe the gods are remote from human affairs) and Pantheists (who see God as the Universe and thus all things are simply God)

This essay has mainly ignored points 3 and 4. I would say point 4 is automatically disqualified as non-Christian doctrine. Point 3 was refuted in the Augustine's Pelagian controversy. I won't spend much time with it, but I will quote a secondary source. The author (Humphries) distinguishes how Augustine integrated his orthodox trinitarian doctrine (meaning, in this case, that he recognizes the full divinity of the Holy Spirit) with his ascetic anthropology, where as Pelagius does not. It was precisely this failure to connect a doctrine of God to human action that sinks Pelagius (who otherwise was an orthodox trinitarian):

"Where Pelagius spoke of the Spirit as a sign of the glory to come, Augustine speaks of the Spirit working within human lives. For Pelagius, the Spirit (merely) points the way; for Augustine, the Spirit leads the way. Where Pelagius speaks of the human response to God’s love, Augustine speaks of human transformation in divine love. Because the Holy Spirit is the divine love which binds the Trinity, and the same divine love operates within Christians, Augustine unites his Trinitarian theology and his anthropology. Pelagius was never able to connect his Trinitarian theology with his (p.82)anthropology, and so, was never able to move into the discussion of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the Christian. Augustine has a significant point to make in this argument: the Holy Spirit acts to heal what is broken and strengthen what is weak in human lives. Instead of destroying human agency, this enables it." ( Thomas Humphries, Ascetic Pneumatology from John Cassian to Gregory the Great, 81-82)

To return to a recurring point throughout this essay: being a predestinarian does not mean embracing either an Augustinian or Calvinist schema of how this predestination works. You can embrace a self-directing (autexousia) idea of the human will, which is important in man's choosing salvation. Such was what John Chrysostom believed. But this self-determing will is still created, even if free, and it's created according to God's foreknowledge where your will's direction is forged either towards good or evil. Some of these schemas may be better than others, or more faithful to scripture, but all use predestination to do conceptual heavy lifting. Such is what predestination does in the Bible, even as man's free choice and responsibility, as well as man's enslavement to sin, is also present.

This conclusion may not be comfortable or easy to stomach. However, predestination means human knowledge about the full scope of events is limited, even if it's possible to pursue. To a degree, asking why this world is like this is equivalent to asking why water's wet. Perhaps when all things are unveiled, and our minds can see the full scope of creation, the fullness of time will make sense. Until then we depend upon the hermeneutic key of Christ crucified, a microcosmic definition of the whole. And just as Christ was crucified from the world's foundation, so too are all our fates sealed in the Book of Life. We're either confirmed as subjects of the New Jerusalem, or we're blotted out forevermore. Such is predestination, the hope God can do anything with anything to pursue the ends He determines according to the divine life He is. sic